Chapter 2 – Military Management

Leadership and Management

Leadership and management in the Air Corps is intricate and has been developing to its current position over a long period. The discourse in this chapter shall be empirical and qualitative in nature. It must be remembered that all military organisations exhibit similar characteristics such as high levels of bureaucracy, pyramid type mechanistic structure, driven by measured amounts of authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism points to status and power differences among employees in organisations as agreed by Bass (1981), in Chapter one of this study. Where an extreme authoritarian personality presents itself in an organisation the process is normally predictable, e.g. intellectually rigid judgmental of others, deferential to people above and exploitative of those below, distrustful, and resistant to change, see Watson (1969), Zaltman and Duncan (1977), in chapter one of this study. This type of behavioural trait does not give the flexibility required in the transformational process of the Nadler and Tushman Model (1977,1980), of Congruent Organisational Behaviour. The inflexible mind results in serious distortion during the processing stage of the four sub processes informal organisation, individual, task and formal organisational arrangements.

This imbalance results in an output of bad organisational fit or the lack of organisational congruence as agreed by French, Bell and Zawacki (1989).

In organisations such as the military jobs are highly structured. The accomplishment of tasks depends on close adherence to rules and regulations. This is where the authoritarian employee should do quite well. This view confirms Harvey’s (1994), analysis in chapter one of this study.

An Irish Defence Forces document (1992), describes “the old authoritarian approach to leadership is no longer valid today.”1 The study also shows a condition exits in the organisation for organisational behaviour/development to be taught on all future career courses. Much knowledge can be derived from the British and the American experience in this regard.

Nadler and Tushman (1980), discuss the task sub process, a part of the transformation process. They show it is critical that organisational members should have developed the proficiency to meet task demands. This is imperative to avoid bad organisational fit.

Norman Dixon (1975), a retired British Army Officer characterises the military authoritarian “as a child who continually whistles in the dark to maintain morale and that the minds of these individuals are like locked doors bolted against what they fear most of all, themselves” 2

An analysis of behavioural patterns will give some insight into why people behave in fixed moulded ways. Weber (1989), is primarily interested with why authoritarianism results in individuals obeying commands and why people do as they are told. Weber fashions the distinction between power and the ability to force people to obey, despite their resistance to authority. Under an authority system, people in the subordinate role see the issuing of directives by those in the superordinate role as legitimate. Weber (1989), outlined three pure types:

      1. Charismatic
      2. Traditional
      3. Rational-legal

In this study I shall solely discuss the rational-legal. Weber (1989), saw the rational-legal authority system as the principle institution of modern society. The system is rational because the means are expressly devised to achieve certain goals. It is legal because authority is exercised with rules and procedures through the office which an individual occupies at a particular time. Weber (1989), calls such an organisation a bureaucracy. He connects the word with inefficiency, placing a special emphasis on red tape and excessive writing and recording. This view is supported by Harvey (1994).

The argument for inefficiency lies in its form. Bureaucracies depict the final stage of depersonalisation. Such organisations have a chain of officials. Their roles are clarified by written definitions of authority. Officials are grouped in a hierarchy, and each successive step embraces that beneath it. Authority is based upon commands observed because the rules state it is within the competence of a particular office holder to issue such commands. Weber (1989), extols such views in chapter one of this study.

Controlling the actions of people, ultimately ensures their total depersonalisation and this class of control is in the interest of organisations such as the military.

Cohen and Gooch (1990), explain that the authoritarian in military life can generate serious mistakes which may be damaging to the general undertaking of the organisation and “will actually predispose an individual towards entering upon the very career wherein his restricted personality can wreck havoc.”3 Dixon (1975), quotes Alfred Vagets, as having once said “a very large part of military history is written, if not for express purposes of supporting an army’s authority and prestige, at least with the intention of not hurting it, not revealing its secrets, avoiding the betrayal of weakness, vacillation or distemper. The historical record of warfare is thus dependent on the writers’ desire to preserve reputations”.4

Authoritarianism to be effective requires a mechanistic structure characterised by high complexity, high formalization etc.

Mechanistic and Organic Structures

Mechanistic Structures consist of three components

      1. Complexity
      2. Formalization
      3.  Centralisation

The organisation uses a confined information network and the communication procedure is mostly downwards as seen in Figure 2.1.

This communication process is very similar to the current system of communicating in the Air Corps. All communication is rigidly channelled through the chain of command which is creating problems such as ‘filtering out information.

The above contrasts sharply with Nadler and Tushman (1977,1980), model of congruence. This shows the informal organisation of the transformation process where, informal arrangements such as the communication process, not planned or written characterise how an organisation actually functions.

Low level members of organisations are generally not involved in the decision making process, Robbins (1991), shows that “the mechanistic structure is synonymous with rigid pyramid-shaped organisation”.5 Mechanistic organisations are very rigid, and rely on authority to facilitate a well defined hierarchy.

To Add Figure 2.1

The mechanistic model is currently used in the Air Corps. This study will show there are inherent problems with the process resulting in the organisation being out of alignment. The net result is weak management and lack of organisational personnel effectiveness. This finding would be consistent with the views of Nadler and Tushman (1977, 1980).

Organic Structure

Organic organisations are insignificant in complexity and formalization. Such establishments have an extensive information network. Robbins (1991), describes the communication process as “utilizing lateral and upward communication as well as downward”.6 Figure 2.2 explains the communication channel in an organic organisation.

This type of communication structure would suit the on going technological transformational development of the Air Corps.

Employees are involved in the decision making process up to high levels. Organic structures are flexible and adaptive. Co-ordination is achieved through continuous communication and process adjustment.

To Add Figure 2.2

Organic structures can increase cohesiveness between unit members and closely align authority with responsibility for the completion of organisational tasks.

This category of structure at the level of transformation process enlarges the individual/task, individual/informal organisation, task/organisation, and organisation/informal organisation sub process. The result is usually increased organisational fit between the sub-components and the three main process of the Congruence Model.

Structures and Strategy

Organisational structure empowers management to achieve its goals. Objectives are obtained from strategy and it is logical to think that organisational structure should follow organisational strategy. If management alters strategy then structure will require realigning to adapt to and support change. This approach between structure and strategy is one foundation stone as depicted by French, Bell and Zawacki (1989), in their discussion of how organisational components can effect change and its knock on effect.

The relationship between machine bureaucracy and professional bureaucracy requires explanation.

Mintzberg’s Machine Bureaucracy

This category of bureaucracy has repetitive operating responsibilities, a formalised procedure of rules and regulations. Organisational tasks can be grouped into departments, authority is centralised and decision making follows the chain of command. The organisation strengthens an elaborate administrative structure and draws a sharp distinction between line and technical duties. Such an organisation fits the structure of the Irish Air Corps.

The type of bureaucracy described possess strengths and weaknesses which are interesting to examine.

A well administered machine bureaucracy does standardised activities directly. The tangible benefits are minimization of duplication, personnel and equipment. Robbins (1991), describes machine bureaucracy as a process by which the organisation “can get by nicely with less talented and, hence less costly middle and lower-level managers”.7 The attention to rules and regulations is a substitute for managerial discretion. Routine operations with a high degree of formalization allow for the decision making process to be centralised. This results in little demand for creative and experienced decision makers below the level of senior executive level.

The effectiveness of the machine bureaucracy is only practical after employees confront difficulties which require to be dissolved. It is also important to revisit past problems which may have not been resolved. This is one major deficiency of the machine bureaucracy.

Many similar correlations exist between Robbins (1991), mechanistic structure and Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy, for example, complexity, formalization and centralisation.

The power and control in some machine bureaucracies cause changes in behavioural patterns which will be discussed.

Behavioural Changes

The machine bureaucracy is consumed with complete control and this is augmented through rules and regulations. The command of power levels by executive managers in essence means that most subordinates are not empowered. This is the current situation in the Air Corps. It is debatable whether employees relish working in this environment or do well under its constraints. This is largely conditional on the bureaucratic direction of organisational employees. People who enjoy predictable work, like this working environment which provides certainty and regularity. The organisation depicts high division of labour, high formalization with a fine span of control, and very restricted decision judgments which makes some jobs seem servile. Such jobs are low on skill variety, identification of duty, significance of task, and autonomy. Sometimes employees can be alienated from work and this can occur when jobs are unchallenging. This produces a reaction from management, resulting in an expectation that employees rigidly follow the rules or are treated like machines rather than human beings with individual needs and concerns.

Mintzbergs, machine bureaucracy would tally very low in Nadler and Tushmans model of Organisational Behaviour at the output stage. It would not contribute very satisfactorily to good achievement, thus adversely affecting individual organisational behaviour.

Individuals who postulate a high degree of bureaucratic orientation place a heavy dependence on higher authority, prefer formalised rules, relationships with work associates. Such people are better suited to mechanistic formations. People with a low degree of bureaucratic orientation are better suited to organic structures. Figure 2.3 shows the main differences between mechanistic and organic organisations and the effect it has on aspects of organisational policy.

The relationship between a mechanistic and organic organisation will now be tested on the Air
Corps.

To Add Figure 2.3

The organisation of The Irish Air Corps

The Defence Act 1954 to 1990, defines the Air Corps as an Air Component of the Defence Forces. Military aviation is generally orientated towards supporting the army in the field, e.g. supplying units, troop carrying, forward reconnaissance etc. using light aircraft, i.e. helicopter or fixed wing. The Air Corps has not conformed to the accepted culture and norms of the army. However, much of the corps operational flying is in support of the army including various civil power roles. A lot of time is spent on training to meet standards which far surpass that of ‘Army Aviation’, having much in common with the standards of an ‘Air Force’.

The Air Corps Air Stations are at Baldonnel, Co. Dublin and Gormanstown, Co. Meath. Headquarters are situated at Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ), Dublin. Small Air detachments are at Finner Camp, Co. Donegal and at Monaghan Barracks, Co. Monaghan. The Air Corps fleet consists of twenty-four fixed wing aircraft and fifteen service helicopters.

The following list of aircraft types shows the wide diversity of service aircraft flown by the Air Corps.

Fixed Wing

One Gulf Stream (G4), (American), one Beech Super King Air (American), seven Siai-Marchetti (Italian), Six Fouga Magister (French), nine Cessna (American), and two Casa (Spanish).

Helicopters

Five Dauphin (French) Aerospatiale, two Gazelle (French), eight Aerospatiale Alouette III (French).

The above represents a total Air Corps fleet of 39 service aircraft.

The Group Headquarters is at Baldonnel and is commanded by a Colonel, containing various sections, e.g. Operations, Intelligence, Photographic, and Administration (A) and Quartermaster stores (Q). The Station Commander is responsible for the daily maintenance of the Air Corps and is commanded by a Lt. Colonel. A total of five Air Corps sections are responsible to Group HQ.

Figure 2.4 explains the current working chain of command in the Air Corps.

To Add Figure 2.4

Apprentice Training

The Air Corps Apprentice School provides skilled technicians for positions in the various departments after completion of technical training.

Apprentices receive training as Aircraft Technicians (mechanical or systems), i.e. mechanical to work on aircraft structures/engines or systems. They can also work on Avionic/Electrical/Instrument Systems. The training technique used in the Apprentice School is based on completion of a modular training programme. The training period is over three years of study, leading to Air Cops technical approval and the award of civilian qualifications.

The above short account of Air Corps history and taskings can be fitted into Nadler and Tushman (1977,1980), Model of Organisational Behaviour. This is the beginning of the process which moves congruently through the transformational process to produce an output which maintains organisational stability. It is also the formation of culture.

Development of military management

Civilian management methodologies have developed from management practices in the military down through the years. Sadly this is not so today and civilian management processes have excelled far ahead of their military counterparts. In the civilian field of management interest is growing and demand exists for professionally qualified management personnel. This evidence is supported by the high number of graduates leaving third level institutions each year. Both the private and public sectors are recruiting a very wide diverse range of management skills and the Air Corps must now be assertive in the two most important areas organisational structure and allocation of finance. Personnel in the organisation are expected to increase levels of work performance and more flexibility is demanded. The extra work load is generally decreasing satisfaction, motivation and personnel see no opportunity for planned self-improvement in terms of career advancement. The Air Corps is lacking in the strategic management skill factor and this situation must be addressed by releasing suitable personnel for extensive training in the areas already identified. All Air Corps training courses both at NCO and Commissioned Officer level should contain management and personnel training modules.

Management training is taken very seriously by Irish organisations and companies expend as much as 2% to 4.5% of annual payroll expenditure on management developmental training. The Air Corps must invest its resources into this vital area for the future of the organisation.

The board report of Cadet and Officer Training and Education in The Permanent Defence Forces (1992), shows that all officers should receive management training appropriate to rank on career courses. The report goes on to identify areas of importance to career officers. The following is an example, “well-developed communication skills, an understanding of the environment in which Defence Forces management must function. An understanding of fiscal management and responsibility, an understanding of resource management in a competitive setting and in a scarce resource environment.” 8

It is difficult to ascertain what progress to date has been made in the above identified areas. Personnel management issues along with organisational development training have been overlooked on career courses at NCO and Commissioned Officer level.

The above is a short historical account of the development of military management and identified weaknesses. When this is related to the congruence model of organisational behaviour it shows that certain problems have been carried through the historical development stage. This information fed into the input stage of the model shows straight away that the preceding stages are out of alignment.

Air Corps Management

The style of leadership and management used, is unique in practice and has not altered or shifted in position over the years. Rather than discussing the style of management in each unit of the Air Corps, a general discussion shall follow.

In July 1980, General Edward C. Meyer said “Leadership and management are neither synonymous nor interchangeable. Clearly good civilian managers must lead, and good military leaders must manage. Both qualities are essential to success”.9

Air Corps Officers are imbued with command and control of the Air Corps. This function is invested in them by the Minister for Defence. All leadership and management control functions are exclusive to this small body of people ranging in rank from Second Lieutenant to Brigadier General. Most of the officers are pilot officers and the minority of non-pilot officers are general line officers or engineering officers (university graduates). All decisions made by this group are likely to in the first instance to acknowledge the ethos of the officer body thus reinforcing the character of the group.

Crises Leadership/management

Crisis leadership/management is evident in the Air Corps, giving cause to the perception that the organisation thrives on everything that is negative and rejects all things positive. The organisation is largely reactive to situations as they occur and generally fails to be strategic in orientation. One recent example of weak leadership/management shall now be discussed.

Example of weak leadership/management

An Cosantóir, May 1993, the Defence Forces monthly magazine, carried an article outlining new opportunities in the Air Corps for Airborne Radar and Sensor Operators (ARO’s). Job vacancies arose as a result of the Air Corps purchasing two new Spanish-built Casa, maritime patrol aircraft. The aircraft are to protect Ireland’s rich fishing stocks in the Economic Zone extending of shore to an area of 132,000 square miles, more than four times the land mass of Ireland.

The Irish Defender, a publication of the Permanent Defence Forces Representative Association (PDFORRA), carried an advertisement for the Air Corps entitled “The Air Corps Require: Trainee Airborne Radar Operators for The New CN235 Maritime Patrol Aircraft …. Look Out for The ‘Radar Operator’ road show At Your Barracks Soon!”10

An Cosantóir featured the Air Corps are looking for personnel aged between 19-25 and applications are welcome from any service/corps (Defence Forces wide) up to the rank of Sergeant. It is important that applicants have a keenness to fly as ARO’s are likely to spent hundreds of hours each year participating in flying duties. The ability to be part of and work collectively in a team is important. The Air Corps authorities view this as the most important element of all. Candidates accepted for training will be expected to learn a range of aviation related subjects. Successful candidates will “from the first day of training …. flying pay is payable (low rate) …. but the precise rates of additional pay following qualification have not yet been finalised.”11

Air Corps weekly routine orders (information circulated to the Defence Forces Population) dated 17 November 1993, sets out in detail the Casa programme, candidate eligibility for ARO evaluation course, evaluation/interview, numbers required, and confirms that “successful candidates will be required to fly and flying pay will therefore be payable on commencement of the course” (low rate).”12

In effect the Air Corps authorities are looking for candidates who are highly intelligent, well motivated, possessing personal self-discipline, responsive to training. The summation would be, a good all rounder is required.

A total of 9 ARO personnel were selected for in-depth technical training which continued for eight months in Ireland, Canada and Spain.

A total of fourteen staff of Air Support Company Signals became involved in the project from July 1993. This initially was on a voluntary basis with a view of becoming permanent (decision still pending) to operate the data-link onboard the aircraft. Due to non-formalization of the Casa manpower process and poor morale the above unit has seen 50% of participating personnel ending their volunteer status on the programme. A small percentage of volunteers from the signals unit participating in the Casa programme actually receive flying pay at the low rate.

The signal’s personnel received no formal training in the data link operation and most volunteers learned by watching colleagues on board the aircraft during flying missions.

Over two years since the commencement of operational flying many problems have occurred which could have been prevented if decisive action had been taken before modest problems become enormous.

      1. At the planning stage of the Casa programme in 1988/90, the board of officers involved were mainly engineers and pilots. No officer with specialisation in personnel management made any contribution to the manpower function of the programme. The Air Corps does not have a dedicated personnel management section staffed by professionally qualified personnel.The following issues were overlooked by the board, mainly because the board members had no professional background or experience in personnel management:a. Crew ratios for each aircraft requires to be decided. The predicted number of annual flying hours for each Casa to be decided. Knowledge of following factors will help in the decision making process, predicted annual leave, sick leave, uncertified leave, One special leave, external training, court appearances concerning the job function etc.

        b. A job design/job description analysis/person specification for each job function on the aircraft.

        c. Rates of remuneration require to be established including low/high rate, of flying pay for all flying participants. Appropriate rates of increased technical pay for job specialisation to be decided. Subsistence rates of pay for all personnel who work outside normal duty hours requires formalization. The current situation is ad-hoc in this regard as some personnel are paid and some are not. All Casa maritime missions are deemed to be in aid to the civil power, therefore subsistence should be paid according to the laid down criteria.

        d. Safety training is lacking which includes flight ditching techniques, purchase of suitable immersion suits and sea survival training is required. Not all personnel currently engaged in maritime flying operations can swim.

        e. Personnel have not been informed that deployment on active flying duties can affect current insurance policies including mortgage protection insurance policies. Mechanisms are already in place where military personnel can overcome this problem.

      2.  A communications audit in the Air Corps is urgently required. This should be repeated every two to three years to check the efficiency of the process.
      3. The discontent regarding what attracts security duty allowance needs to be defused as this situation is fuelling de-motivation among members of the casa aircrew and has persisted since.
      4. Teamwork/leadership training is urgently required as conflict and confusion is arising during flying missions over the total role of individual team members. The potential for serious conflict is emerging between Pilot Officers and ARO’s (Enlisted Personnel).
      5. No account is taken in relation to the sophistication of the electronic equipment on board the casa maritime patrol aircraft in terms of structuring rank to work responsibility.
      6. One non-commissioned officer interviewed on Friday 8 March 1996, said in relation to the above problems that “the situation is reinforcing views that the military authorities (Air Corps officers) do not take seriously the views of Enlisted Personnel. The knock on effect of this is that morale goes down therefore work suffers.”

Taking Risks

The day of the authoritarian leader is limited in bureaucratic organisations and this style of leadership is acknowledged in the Air Corps. One major failing of the present style of leadership is that officers are not encouraged to take risks in leadership/management. General line management decision making in the Air Corps does not come quickly to officers. It is very slow, distant and not focussed on the resolution of sources of potential conflict. The officer body is always conscious of not making any mistakes at all costs. Mistakes have been known to take their toll on officers careers, resulting in the Officer Corps avoiding making decisions for as long as possible. One officer stated “it would be better for an officers career if officers signed no document or report, entered into no controversy, and be constantly polite with fellow officers.”

Employee Involvement Approaches

Throughout the Civil Sector, British Armed Forces and American Armed Forces rapid interest and growth is emerging in employee involvement (El). With organisations downsizing and delayering management demands increase for lower costs, higher performance, greater flexibility of the workforce. This translates into maximising the participation, commitment, and productivity of all employees. This section of the study is recommending moving decision making downwards in the organisation, closer to where the actual work takes place in the Air Corps. The benefits of increased commitment leads to rapid decision making, continuous performance improvements, and greater employee flexibility, commitment and satisfaction.

Employee involvement in the Air Corps would lead to more output from the transformation process leading to greater levels of congruence at the final output stage of the model.

The Royal Air Force (RAF), operate a Ministry of Defence Ideas Scheme which is open to all ranks. The RAF News, published an article on 22 September 1995, informing the readers that a junior technician was awarded £3,200 under the scheme for designing a test schedule to confirm the serviceability of the fuel content’s sensor in the Tornado Aircraft. Up to this there had been no way of testing the sensor and the old ones were thrown away. The idea is believed to represent a saving to the RAF of more than £10 million pounds.

A similar scheme for the Air Corps would be one way of getting personnel involved in releasing constructively, positive energy to benefit the organisation.

A Master Sergeant from the US Navy, was interviewed in Baldonnel on 30th November 1995. He emphasised very strongly that in the navy NCO’s are totally involved in the process of employee involvement and are therefore given levels of responsibility appropriate to rank. It is policy of the navy to consult widely with NCO’s before major decisions are made.

Cummings and Worley (1993), in their discourse on employee involvement cite that the phrase is very broad including ‘participative management, industrial democracy, quality of work life and worker empowerment’.13 The authors also discuss that El includes four elements which can promote meaningful involvement in workplace decisions ‘power, rewards, information, and knowledge skills’.14 Organisations participating in El programmes have no inhibitions discussing any of the following items:

      1. Co-operative union-management projects
      2. Quality control circles
      3. Total quality management

Generally El has been promoted by trade unions and management and has often been proclaimed as an approach to increasing productivity.

Working Definition of Employee Involvement

To move power down in an organisation using the principles of El involvement, four important areas are involved.

      1. Power-Empowerment of people helps to make better decisions and generally covers work methods, task assignments, performance outcomes, employee selection etc. The degree of empowerment can change enormously, from asking for input into decisions made, Show (subsequently made by managers), joint decision making between managers and workers and employees making decisions for themselves.
      2. Information – Imparting information on time in organisations is critical to the decision making process. Employee involvement can be promoted by ensuring that relevant information vital to the decision making function is made accessible to employees.
      3. Knowledge and skills – Organisational effectiveness and employee involvement is based on the requisite skills and knowledge acquired to make good decisions. By providing training and development programmes, members can broaden their depth of information. Such learning can cover areas such as performing tasks, making decisions, solving problems, and understanding how the organisation operates.
      4. Rewards – Meaningful opportunity for employee involvement provides employees with internal rewards, such as feelings of self-worth and accomplishment. By offering external rewards such as pay increases, promotions etc. and making linkages to performances outcomes effects a higher level of performance.

The four elements already described are dependent for success on how far down the organisation power is moved and the total level of employee involvement.

How El Affects Productivity

The link between El and work output, is derived from the idea that by giving people more involvement in work decisions, they will become more fulfilled with their work and less alienated from it.

Employee Involvement interventions can enhance employee motivation, particularly when they satisfy individual needs. Motivation is translated into improved performance when people have the necessary abilities to perform well and when the technology and work situation allow people to achieve a level of congruence. Increased employee satisfaction can have an impact on productivity by attracting good employees to join and remain with the organisation. Figure 2.5 shows how employee involvement affects productivity.

To Add Figure 2.5

Total Quality Management

Total Quality management (TQM), is perhaps the most recent and comprehensive approach to employee involvement. It is a long term effort that aligns all the organisation’s activities around quality. Total quality is achieved when organisational processes reliably produce products and services that meet or exceed customer expectations and when commitment to the continuous improvement of all processes becomes a part of the organisation’s culture. TQM is very popular in the 1990’s and organisations such as the US Navy and Army have carried out total quality interventions.

TQM trusts power downwards in the organisation, provides relevant information to all employees, secures rewards to performance, and increases worker’s knowledge and skill through extensive training. When implemented successfully TQM is also closely aligned with a firm’s general business strategy and attempts to change the entire organisation towards continuous quality improvement.

Total quality management is typically carried out in five major stages:
      1. Senior Management Commitment – This phase involves gaining senior management support and long term commitment to TQM. Training costs increase in line with modifications of company policy and top executives must be willing to make investments and changes accordingly. To implement TQM generally takes three years, and senior management are compelled to give commitment throughout the change programme.
      2. Training in quality methods – Extensive training is required in TQM implementation and in the principles and devices of quality improvement. The training given at the commencement
        of a long-term process in continuous improvement and the knowledge gained comprehend
        variations in organisational processes, to identify sources of avoidable expenditure, and to
        monitor the consequences of change on product and service quality.
      3. Quality improvement projects – This part of TQM implementation consist of individuals and work groups applying the quality method to enrich organisational processes. They seek to identify output variations, to intervene to reduce deviations from quality standards, to monitor improvements, and to repeat this quality improvement cycle indefinitely. Identifying output variations is a key aspect of TQM. Such principles are measured by the percentage of imperfect products or of customer satisfaction along a set of qualitative and quantitative proportions.
      4. Measure progress – To carry out this stage involves the assessment of organisational processes against quality standards. These standards are known as bench marks and represent the finest in organisational achievements and practices for different processes. Bench marks can be a competitor’s performance status or some level of performance generally accepted as world class.
      5. Accomplishment – This is the final stage of TQM implementation, the organisation attempts to connect rewards to improvements in quality. TQM does not monitor and reward outcomes normally tracked by conventional reward systems, such as the number of units produced. Rather, reward is process oriented by focussing on gains in customers perceived satisfaction with product performance and other marks of quality. Continuous improvements even insignificant ones, are an important part of the new organisational culture associated with TQM.A movement towards employee involvement and total quality management would greatly enhance the personnel function and assist in aligning organisational members with the technology in the Air Corps.

Conclusion

The problems associated with authoritarianism and bureaucracies have been explained and this style of leadership and organisation is inflexible therefore difficulties are encountered when this is applied to the Nadler and Tushman Model of Congruent Behaviour (1977, 1980).

Differences between mechanistic and organic structures and their application to the Air Corps about personnel issues has been explored. Where possible problems which affect the stability of the model of congruent behaviour have been discussed. The development of military management has been investigated and contrasted with problems associated with current Air Corps leadership/management and many outcomes have been discussed using the model of congruent behaviour. Developing personnel management resources will be examined in Chapter Three of my study..

Approaches incorporating employee involvement and the requirement for total quality management in the Air Corps have been explored. The benefits of both approaches in terms of increasing organisational commitment, motivation and job satisfaction have been acknowledged.

*****

1 Report of The Board On The Review Of Cadet And Officer Training And Education In The Permanent Defence Forces. – Ch. 6.5.2.2

2 Dixon N.F. – On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence. – P. 280.

3 Cohen and Gooch.- Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy Of Failure In War. – P. 9.

4 Dixon N.F. – On the Psychology Of Military Incompetence. – P. 19.

5 Robbins S.P. – Organisational Behaviour. – P. 488.8

6 Robbins S.T. – Organisational Behaviour 5th edition. – P. 488.

7 Robbins S.P. – Organisational Behaviour, 5th edition. – P. 507.

8 Report of the Board On The Review of Cadet And Officer Training And Education in The Permanent Defence Forces. – P.5.14.4

9 Leadership – Quotations from the Military Tradition. – P. 161.

10 Irish Defender – November 1993. – P. 16.

11 An Cosantóir – May 1993. – P. 15.

12 Admin Wing AC GP R/O Ser No. 46/93 D/17.11.93

13 Cummings T.G. & Worley C.G. – Organisation Development and Change 5th edition. – P. 304.

14 14 Cummings T.G. & Worley C.G. – Organisation and Change 5th edition. – P. 304