Dáil Éireann Written Answers 4/12/18 – Department of Defence – Air Corps senior management withheld Trike Report from government appointed investigator

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 108

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence if a report on the use of Trikelone N in the Air Corps workshop compiled in 2014 by the formation safety office of the Air Corps was made available to the independent person (details supplied) appointed to investigate health and safety matters in the Air Corps; if not, the reason it was not available to them; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [50343/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

The report of the independent person appointed to investigate health and safety matters in the Air Corps is published and available on my Department’s website. Appendix C of that report lists documents and materials consulted and reviewed by him.

The document, to which the Deputy refers, is the subject of legal advice and in light of ongoing litigation, I am not in a position to comment further.

*****

Introduction

Trikelone N is a vapor de-greaser which was used as a cleaning agent in the process of cleaning engine parts due to be overhauled. Its use was  discontinued in the Air corps just prior to September 2007.

Work practices

One (1) pair of gloves was available to be used between all personnel who could be required to carryout the process. No personnel P.P.E. issue was made to individuals. MSDS sheets were available but no records of training on the dangers of using Trikelone N or the process or how to properly carryout the process exists. Two large extractor fans were placed on the wall behind where the process took place, but there is no record of the capacity of the fans, their specification or if they were adequate. There was no organised segregation of work areas. The double doors that separated the area where the Degreasing process took place from the adjoining area here normally left open. The personnel’s tea making and meeting room was in an annex off this adjoining Engine assembly area. The workshop heating system was also located in the adjoining Engine assembly area. Originally peoples personnel lockers were located in the immediate area where the Degreasing process took place, but the lockers where relocated into the adjacent Engine assembly area at a later date.

Possible Trikelone N exposure sources

Current Trikelone N MSDS states that exposure through, skin, hair, eyes and inhalation should be avoided and that contaminated clothes should be removed.

  • Trikelone N exposure through inhalation, skin, hair and eyes could have resulted as individuals were not issued P.P.E. to protect against the substance. Due to the lack of records it can not be assumed that the two fans located on the wall behind where the process took place offered adequate ventilation.
  • The lack of organised segregation of work areas where doors between areas were left open meant that vapours could travel from one area to another. No seals or segregation areas existed.
  • Vapours could have travelled to the personnel’s tea making and meeting room which was located in an annex off the adjoining Engine assembly area and could have resulted in ingestion of the chemical by way of food contamination.
  • The location of people’s personnel lockers which were located in the immediate area where the Degreasing process took place, and then relocated into the adjacent Engine assembly area at a later date. Would give a reasonable assertion that the contamination of persons clothes contained in their lockers would have taken place.
  •  The heater located in the Engine assembly area took air in just above floor level and pushed out hot air above head height circulating the air around the Engine assembly area. When the doors between the Engine assembly area and the area in which the De-greasing took place were left open, the air would be circulated between both areas. Due to the Trikelone N being heavier than air a high concentration of Trikelone N would have been located near the heaters inlet vents.
  •  The heater was adapted by Cpl. XXXXX so that the air being heated would be circulated into various other areas in the building including the Machine Workshop, NTD bay and Workshop offices by way of ventilation duct which could have exposed a risk of contamination of the air in those locations that might not have occurred previously. There is no record available if this work was approved, who authorised it, or was the design appropriate.
  • Due to the fact that Trikelone N expands when heated, the risk of explosion
    increased when the Trikelone N contaminated air passed through the  heater.
  • Poor hygiene controls before food consumption and going to the toilet would also be a cause of exposure.

Controls

The following controls are currently recommended when using Trikelone N.

  • Isolating controls should be put in place to limit exposure.
  • Adequate ventilation and extraction should be in place.
  • Do not use in a confined space as vapour is heavier than air.
  • Appropriate P.P.E to be provided including overalls, boots, chemical eye protection, impervious gloves and organic vapour respirator.
  • Wash hands before smoking, eating, drinking or using the toilet.
  • Contaminated clothes to be washed.

The Defence Forces Safety Standards 1991 which were a precursor to the Defence Forces Safety Statement is the closest thing I could find regarding some form of documented control standard in the Defence Forces. The Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 would have been in affect, but the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Chemical Agent) Regulations 2001 would have only been in affect for a short period of the exposure. The Defence Forces Safety Standards 1, Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) covers…

Section 1 Information Sources
  • MSDS sheets should be given by suppliers of Chemicals to the Defence
    Forces.
Section 3 Principles of Assessment
  • Obtaining and Passing on knowledge about a Chemical
  • Assessment of Hazards posed by its use, byproducts, storage and disposal.
  • Control of the Chemical using Engineering techniques, safe operating procedures and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
  • Monitoring the Effectiveness of the Control strategy.
Section 4 Control

Documents how controls are to be put in place using a hierarchy of Controls
not unlike what is currently used.

  • Elimination
  •  Substitution
  • Enclosure
  • Isolation
  • Local exhaust ventilation and reduced time exposure
  • Dilution ventilation
  • Use of PPE
  • Personnel hygiene and washing facilities
  • Training

Summary

As time, processes and technology has changed It is clear that the appropriate controls that would be the standard today were not in place at the time of the process taking place and that potential exposure risks were prevalent. The question posed should be was everything reasonably practicable done to ensure personals safety and health at the time.

On that note did the controls deemed reasonable at the time mirror those deemed reasonable in the present. Can the Defence Forces be found not to have done everything reasonably practicable?

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 27/11/18 – Department of Defence – Air Corps Risk Assessments

Catherine Murphy (Kildare North, Social Democrats)

QUESTION NO: 109

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence if the Air Corps conducts mandatory risk assessments in the context of handling, using and storing dangerous and-or toxic chemicals; the date on which risk assessments in this regard became mandatory; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [49522/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I am advised by the military authorities that if an activity involving the use of chemicals is conducted then this activity will be risk-assessed in accordance with the relevant Health and Safety legislation. The risk assessment will outline the necessary control measures in the handling, use and storage of such chemicals or toxins.

Following three inspections at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel during 2016, the Health and Safety Authority issued a Report of Inspection to the Air Corps on 21 October, 2016. This report listed a number of advisory items for follow up, including the areas of risk assessments and safety statements.

The resultant Air Corps improvement plan confirmed the Air Corps’ full commitment to implementing improved safety measures that protect workers and ensure risks are as low as reasonably practicable. The plan was implemented over eight phases, seven of which the military authorities have advised are now complete, while phase eight – Chemical awareness training and respiratory equipment training – is a continuous, ongoing process.

I wish to assure the Deputy that the health and welfare of the men and women of the Defence Forces is a key priority for me and the military authorities.

*****

Minister Kehoe’s repeated assurances that the Health & Welfare of the men and women of the Defence Forces is a key priority for him and the military authorities ring utterly hollow.

Neither Minister Kehoe nor the military authorities have taken any steps to ascertain if prolonged & unprotected toxic chemical exposure has caused harm to currently serving personnel. They would sooner personnel suffer and die needlessly rather than address the problem. 

There has been no medical investigation, there has been no toxicological investigation. Minister Kehoe’s actions to date show he does not give a damn about the health & welfare of exposed Air Corps personnel. 

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 25/10/18 – Department of Defence – Sick Leave

Jack Chambers (Dublin West, Fianna Fail)

QUESTION NO: 70

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the number of sick days taken by members in each service of the Defence Forces to date in 2018. [44411/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

In line with other sectors, sick leave statistics for the Defence Forces are compiled annually and provided to the Department of Public Expenditure & Reform (D/PER). These statistics are used in order to track the levels of absenteeism across the public service. The absence rates for the public service are then published by D/PER.

The total number of sick leave days claimed by members of the Army, Naval Service and Air Corps as of the 23rd October is outlined in the tabular format below.

ServiceSick Leave 2018
Up to 23/10/18
Service Strength
Up to 31/10/18
Average Sick Leave Per Person
Army55,24272367.5
Naval Service5,4209935.5
Air Corps6889709
9.7
Total67,55190287.5

 

*****

Why are Air Corps personnel 30% sicker than their Army counterparts. 

DELAY – DENY – DIE

PRESS RELEASE – ACCAS launch de-election campaign for Junior Minister for Defence

Both the Minister for Defence Leo Varadkar and the Minister of State with responsibility for Defence Paul Kehoe have failed to offer medical assistance to save the lives and ease the suffering of Air Corps Chemical Abuse Survivors and apparently believe the best place to obtain medical help is via the High Court. In the meantime the State Claims Agency is doing all in its power to prevent cases of injured Air Corps personnel from reaching court in order to hide their own negligence.

We recognise the Junior Minister Kehoe has a vulnerable Fine Gael seat in the Wexford constituency and we have started our campaign to prevent his re-election.

  • We need non means tested medical cards for personnel who served in Irish Air Corps prior to
  • We need awareness campaigns for exposed Air Corps personnel & former work experience students from the University of Limerick.
  • We need access to state backed medical vigilance & cancer screening programs.
  • We need coordination of GPs, consultants & hospitals nationwide.

Minister Kehoe does not have the courage nor conviction to help. Minister Kehoe appears happy to let men who served in the Irish Air Corps die unnecessarily. 19 men have died since the first Health & Safety protected disclosure was made in 2015. Some of these men could have been saved.

We will ACTIVELY canvass AGAINST Minister Paul Kehoe T.D. in the next general election. This is one seat Fine Gael will NOT be relying upon in the 33rd Dáil.

Delay – Deny – Die

Dáil Éireann Written Answers 23/10/18 – Department of Defence – Health and Safety

Jack Chambers (Dublin West, Fianna Fail)

QUESTION NO: 172

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the changes in health and safety policies that have been implemented following the publication of the report of the independent reviewer, protected disclosures, Air Corps; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [43404/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I have sought the information from the military authorities and will revert to the Deputy when it is to hand.

 

Jack Chambers (Dublin West, Fianna Fail)

QUESTION NO: 173

To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence if a programme that monitors actual exposure of Defence Forces members to hazardous substances either via personal air monitoring or biological monitoring as outlined in the report of the independent reviewer, protected disclosures, Air Corps is in place; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [43405/18]

Paul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)

I have sought the information from the military authorities and I will revert to the Deputy when it is available.

 

*****

DELAY – DENY – DIE

A message from the office of General Officer Commanding Air Corps

Having served as GOC AC for just over six months it is fair to say that I now have a new insight into the Air Corps and its people. Following on from the recent visit by Minister Kehoe, and my experience in the office to date, I can say with certainty and confidence that I am heartened by the dedication and professionalism of the Air Corps and its personnel, and the very reals individual commitment displayed by you all.

I make no secret of the fact that as an organisation SAFETY is our priority and I am very aware of the value and significance of your own individual contribution to this end. Each and every one of us has a direct responsibility when it comes to safety, and the culture we espouse to, and we must strive to do our very best to achieve this. I am conscious of the fine efforts of all with regard to this shared goal.

“Let there be no ambiguity the Air Corps has an excellent Safety Record”

Untimely deaths of serving and former Air Corps personnel are either increasing or we are missing earlier deaths. The statistics of untimely deaths quite clearly show that the GOC Air Corps is talking nonsense and misinforming the men & women under his command as well as members of the Oireachtas.

Let there be no ambiguity, the Air Corps has an excellent Safety Record and associated Health & Safety regime. We are at the forefront of industry when it comes to processes and standards. This is a real and direct result of the professionalism and expertise of our people and their commitment, and should not be underestimated by and of us.

Cleaning weapons after air firing at Waterford July 2018. Inadequate PPE – Skin, Eyes & Respiratory exposure all in breach of MSDS

I am fully aware that not everything is perfect and we still have a journey to go. With this in mind I want to re-emphasise that when we see a need for change and development that we drive that from within. My message is clear, we all have a duty to drive this progress and you are all empowered to take ownership, and indeed action, when required. Whether it’s the need for specific equipment or a course of training, don’t ignore it and move on , make it happen. It is only with this attitude and outlook that we will be truly successful in our quest. You have my backing and my confidence in this regard.

When a full time Health & Safety enforcement official was requested Air Corps management responded that his could not be economically justified. With 63 men dead, management cannot justify a full time Health & Safety enforcement official but can continue to justify a full time Catholic chaplain costing approximately €60,000 per annum.

Refueling in July 2017, skin and eyes exposed to fuel splashes. Respiratory exposure to kerosene & FSII fumes, aerosols & vapors.

In closing, I am filed with pride on a daily basis when I see the dedication and commitment of our people. Your work and your actions make a real and tangible contribution to the State and its Citizens. and this should never be undervalued. I truly hope that you share in this pride and continue to demonstrate the admirable ethos and values that define the Air Corps

Sean Clancy
Brigadier General
General Officer Commanding the Air Corps

January 2018

***

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Solvent exposure and Parkinson’s disease

Shaun Wood worked was a painter and finisher  at Royal Air Force (RAF) bases across the world. During the early 1990s he was involved in the very intensive work preparing Tornado aircraft for the first Gulf War, in particular gluing anti-missile patches to the aircraft. This work was often done in confined spaces over long working hours.  He generally wore a respirator but these were not really adequate for the circumstances.

German Tornado Undergoing Maintenance

Shaun has been diagnosed with Multiple System Atrophy (MSA), which is a debilitating Parkinsonian syndrome that affects the nervous system. He is just 53 years of age.

Throughout his work Shaun was exposed to various solvents, but primarily trichloroethylene and dichloromethane. There is not a great deal of information about exposure to these solvents in aircraft maintenance. I have seen results from a survey carried out at an RAF base in Scotland where dichloromethane levels were measured during paint striping in the cockpit area of a Nimrod aircraft. There was only 1.5 m2 of paint removed, but the peak air concentrations were about 700 mg/m3. Results from three monitoring surveys where the British Health and Safety Executive sampled for dichloromethane during paint stripping on aircraft are shown in the following figure. The mean levels measured in each of these surveys were: 330, 790 and 1,960 mg/m3, and the highest individual level measured was 3,590 mg/m3.

Read full article on OH-world.org A blog about exposure science and occupational hygiene

http://johncherrie.blogspot.ie/2011/12/solvent-exposure-and-parkinsons-disease.html

*****

Below is a photo of one of the locations in the Irish Air Corps that used Dichloromethane, namely the NDT Shop of Engine Repair Flight. Yes that is a stream of the chemicals dripping out of the extractor fan and running down the wall. And yes that is dichloromethane, cresylic acid and the hexavalent sodium chromate all over the floor. The small barrel that is being dissolved by its contents contains Hydrofluoric Acid.

Some extracts from the Ambient Air Monitoring For Health and Safety at Work report dated 2nd August 1995

  1. Dichloromethane levels were measured in the engine shop in Wednesday the 12th and Thursday the 13th of July 1995 at the behest of Captain John Maloney who is still serving in the Irish Air Corps
  2. The level of dichloromethane found in ambient air in the engine
    cleaning area exceeded health and safety limits. 
  3. Levels of Dichloromethane were measured at 175.9ppm (622.5 mg/m3)  while the TWA health & safety limit for this chemical in 1995 was 50ppm.
  4. Significant levels of all parameters monitored were found in nearly all ambient air samples taken in the engine cleaning area.
  5. The ventilation in all areas monitored was deemed to be insufficient. It is thus recommended that mechanical heating and ventilation systems be adapted designed and installed in all areas monitored.

To summarise, the Irish Army Air Corps knew that Dichloromethane levels in the NDT shop in 1995 exceeded health & safety limits by 3.5 times yet officer management

  1. LEFT personnel of all ranks and none to rot in this exceptionally toxic working environment for a further 12 years.
  2. IGNORED the recommendation to design and install design a proper ventilation system, (they stuck in 2 x Xpelairs).
  3. NEVER re-tested the environment to see if the Xpelair fans worked, we suspect they made things worse by increasing evaporation rate.
  4. NEVER informed personnel of enlisted ranks that their workplace was contaminated to dangerous levels.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Hexamethylene Diisocyanate – Just one of the toxic chemicals the Irish Air Corps and State Claims Agency want to hide from former personnel!

  1. Exposure can occur when isocyanates are curing or when cured isocyanates are heated.
  2. An individual’s response to isocyanate exposure can be immediate or may be DELAYED FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
  3. Skin exposure can also cause respiratory sensitisation.
  4. The odour threshold for isocyanates, i.e. the level at which an individual can smell an isocyanate, is typically higher than the allowed exposure limits.
  5. The Air Corps did eventually provide a “supplied air” respirator to spray paint & welding personnel. Unfortunately they sourced the “supplied air” from an old machine compressor located in ERF where the air had previously tested as 3.5 times over the allowed limit for Dichloromethane i.e. allowed limit was 50ppm and sourced air was from a location measured at 175ppm…out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Air Corps Hexamethylene Diisocyanate Usage

Hexamethylene Diisocyanates were a chemical component of polyurethane paint hardener used by the Spray Paint Shop (Dope Shop) at Baldonnel. For most of the existence of this shop personnel were NOT supplied with ANY PPE. The walls between the Spray Paint Shop and Engineering Wing Hangar & Workshops were not sealed and so Hexamethylene Diisocyanate and other chemicals entered these workplaces whilst spraying was in progress exposing all personnel.

Furthermore if a component could not be removed from an aircraft for spray painting it was spray painted in-situ in Engineering Wing Hangar whilst unprotected line & tech personnel worked in adjoining offices & workshops or on other aircraft in the hangar.

Visiting personnel to Engineering Wing hangar such as BFTS personnel doing an IRAN, Heli personnel doing an overhaul & even Military Police on a walkabout were also exposed.

A “waterfall” system with an extractor fan was also present. Personnel spray painted aircraft components toward the waterfall which captured most of the over-spray droplets. Fumes from this waterfall were then extracted by a fan, up a duct and released at approximately 3m height where the prevailing winds then carried the extracted fumes in the doors & windows of : 

  • 5th Maintenance Engineers
  • Air Corps Apprentice School
  • Avionics Squadron
  • BFW Stores
  • Engine Repair Flight
  • Old Tech Stores
  • Training Wing HQ Prefab
  • Parachute Shop

5-20% of people are prone to isocyanate sensitisation. and isocyanate cross sensitisation is a recognised phenomenon. Sensitisation is irreversible and unfortunately once sensitised it is next to impossible to avoid isocyanate allergy triggers in the modern environment as they are used to make all Polyurethane products.

It is also likely that health effects are suffered beyond the respiratory system & skin for example the gastric & nervous systems and it is also probable that sensitisation to isocyanates will lead to allergies to other unrelated chemicals leading to a cascade of triggering chemicals allergies & intolerance for over exposed individuals.

DELAY – DENY – DIE

Enterprise Risk Management Recognition for the Defence Forces

Defence Forces personnel being presented with certificates from the State Claims Agency in McKee Barracks in recognition of compliance with health and safety management system audit process.

In photo from left to right: Comdt Thomas Farrell (OC Gormanston, Defence Forces), Sgt Gerald O’Gorman (Unit Safety Officer, 30 Inf Bn, Kilkenny, Defence Forces), Fiona Kearns (Senior Enterprise Risk Manager, SCA), Comdt Noel Maher (Defence Force Safety Officer), Cpl Ross Hayden (Unit Safety Officer Air Corps Military Training College), Ciarán Breen (Director, SCA), Brig Gen Peter O’Halloran Assistant Chief Of Staff, Capt Bronagh McMorrow (Unit Safety Officer CIS Group DFTC), Pat Kirwan (Deputy Director, SCA), Comdt Conor Ryan (Formation Safety Officer, DFTC), Paul Burke (Enterprise Risk Manager, SCA)

See State Claims Agency website below…

Delay – Deny – Die

Safe Handling of Cresols, Xylenols & Cresylic Acids

Introduction

Cresols, xylenols and cresylic acids are hazardous substances and dangerous both to people and the environment if handled improperly. Cresols, xylenols and cresylic acid products produced by Sasol Chemicals (USA) LLC are highly versatile materials and are used as intermediates in the manufacture of a wide variety of industrial products such as resins, flame retardants, antioxidants, and coatings. In these and other applications, cresylic acids can be stored, transferred, processed and disposed of safely when proper procedures and safeguards are used. 

“Cresol” refers to any of the three isomers of methylphenol (C7H8O) or combinations thereof. “Cresols” commonly refer to a mixture which is predominantly methylphenol but may also contain lesser amounts of other alkylphenols. “Xylenol” is a common name for any of the six isomers of dimethylphenol (C8H10O) or their various combinations. Material which is predominantly dimethylphenol but which also contains ethylphenols and other alkylphenols may be referred to as “Xylenols”. “Cresylic acid” is a generic term referring to various combinations of cresols, xylenols, phenol or other alkylphenols (ethylphenols, propylphenols, trimethylphenols, etc.). 

Purpose & Scope

The purpose of this document is to provide information gathered through Sasol’s long experience in the safe handling of cresylic acids. It focuses on basic and practical information about working safely with these substances. Additional references are provided and it is strongly recommended that these and others be consulted prior to working with cresylic acids. Please do not hesitate to contact your regional Sasol office if we can be of assistance in the safe storage, handling, processing and disposal of our products.

Hazards

Health Hazards

The primary dangers posed in handling cresylic acids are those resulting from physical exposure. Cresylic acids are highly corrosive and contact with exposed skin or mucous membranes causes severe burns. These burns progress from an initial whitening of the exposed skin to blackishbrown necroses within 24 hours after exposure. Cresylic acids also exhibit anesthetic properties. Therefore, victims frequently misjudge the extent of their exposure when the initial burning sensation rapidly subsides. This can result in prolonged contact, causing toxic effects in addition to the corrosive damage. 

Cresylic acids are readily absorbed through the skin and mucous membranes in liquid or vapor form and act as systemic toxins for which there is no established treatment. Relatively small areas of exposure (e.g. an arm or a hand) can allow sufficient absorption to cause severe poisoning. Progressive symptoms of such poisoning include headache, dizziness, ringing in the ears, nausea, vomiting, muscular twitching, mental confusion, loss of consciousness and, possibly, death from lethal paralysis of the central nervous system. Chronic exposure can lead to loss of appetite, vomiting, nervous disorders, headaches, dizziness, fainting and dermatitis. 

The Occupational Health & Safety Administration (OSHA) has established 5ppm or 22 mg/m3 permissible exposure limits (PEL’s) for cresols on an 8-hour time-weighted average basis. OSHA guidelines also indicate that adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) should be employed to avoid skin contact with cresols. Cresylic acids are not listed as carcinogens by OSHA, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) or the National Toxicology Program (NTP).

Environmental Hazards

Cresylic acids show high acute toxicity towards both fish and aquatic invertebrates and must be prevented from entering surface or ground waters. Depending upon the specific composition, the material may be classified as a marine pollutant. Please refer to the current label and safety datasheet.

Controls for Working with Cresols

Safe storage, handling, processing and disposal of cresylic acids begin long before they ever arrive on-site. Measures necessary to ensure the health and well-being of employees, customers, the community and the  environment include the development of effective administrative and engineering controls designed to specifically address the hazards associated with cresylic acids. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is integral to safe handling and should be viewed as the last line of defense against an accidental failure of the administrative and/or engineering controls. 

Administrative Controls

Administrative controls are the foundation of any program designed for safely handling cresylic acids. Every company is unique in how they run their business and establish administrative controls. Those specifically developed for working with cresylic acids should address comprehensive process planning, thorough communication of hazards to employees and extensive training of employees on the proper implementation of all safety measures.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

All personnel who work with or near cresylic acids must use adequate personal protective equipment (PPE). The extent of the potential exposure and consideration of established permissible exposure limits (PEL’s) should dictate the level of protection necessary. Personnel working with or near lab-scale quantities should always wear safety glasses with side-shields or

chemical mono-goggles, chemical-resistant or impermeable gloves, long-sleeved shirts and trousers as a minimum.

Circumstances such as elevated temperature and pressure or vacuum conditions should dictate if more substantial protection is necessary, including face shields, chemically impermeable outerwear, and breathing protection. Personnel transferring larger quantities of cresylic acids, or working in areas where a line-break could result in similar exposure, should always wear full protective equipment.

Emergency Procedures

Physical Exposure – External

The primary dangers involved in working with cresylic acids are the corrosive and toxic effects resulting from a physical exposure. Studies suggest that the severity of the exposure depends more on the magnitude of the exposed skin area than the concentration of cresylic acid. Therefore, the critical factor in dealing with an external physical exposure to cresylic acids is to minimize the extent and duration of the contact. To this end, the immediate response must be thorough flushing of the exposed areas with copious amounts of running water to remove all the cresylic acid in contact with the skin or eyes. Any contaminated clothing should be removed as quickly and carefully as possible during this process to avoid any additional skin contact.

Any exposed areas will have readily absorbed the cresylic acids and may be evidenced by a characteristic whitening of the skin. After thorough flushing with water, a solution consisting of 2 parts polyethylene glycol 400 to 1 part ethanol (PEG/EtOH) should be liberally applied to any affected skin (avoid contact with eyes), allowed to remain 15 to 30 seconds and then flushed away with fresh running water. Continue the cycling of PEG/EtOH and water for at least 15 minutes and then finish with thorough washing with soap and water. This decontamination procedure reduces the severity of the exposure, but does not completely eliminate damage to the skin or toxic effects. Medical attention should be sought as soon as possible.

Spill Containment & Clean-Up

Spill containment and cleanup of cresylic acids should only be performed by properly trained personnel employing an appropriate level of protective equipment as dictated by the extent of the spill. Small to medium spills on land should be surrounded by and absorbed onto inert clay absorbent and transferred to a disposal container. Larger land-spills should be diverted away from waterways, contained with booms, dikes or trenches, and collected in a vacuum truck. Any residual cresylic acids remaining after vacuuming should be cleaned up using the clay absorbent. All soils affected by the spill should be removed and placed in approved disposal containers.

Water spills are of particular concern due to the acute toxicity of cresylic acids to marine life. Clean up efforts should focus on containing the spill and quickly removing the cresylic acids that settle in deeper areas of the waterway. This can be aided greatly if the flow of water can be slowed or stopped. Further efforts should focus on removing as much of the dissolved cresylic acids as possible from the water using activated charcoal.

The composition and extent of any spill should be evaluated against local guidelines (ex. SARA Title III and RCRA in the U.S.) and reported to the proper agencies, if necessary. Any non disposable clean-up equipment should be thoroughly decontaminated with soap and water after use.

Source : SASOL / USA

Safe Handling of Cresols, Xylenols & Cresylic Acids

 *****


Some significant points to note about Cresylic Acid

Below is a photo taken 10 years ago in the Irish Army Air Corps NDT shop,  part of the Avionics / ERF building complex. Ardrox 666 can be seen spilled on the ground where it was free to leach through a shore onto the grass verge outside. 

  • 25% of fresh Ardrox 666 used by the Air Corps was Cresylic Acid. This percentage was higher in waste Ardrox 666 as Dichloromethane evaporated.
  • That greenish / yellow stain dripping from the extractor fan is also Ardrox 666 from the air.

DELAY – DENY – DIE